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Elleman et al.: Naval Blockades in Peace and War: An Economic History since 1750

Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Stonewall
Jackson have already appeared—are designed to be “quick reads,” of as much
interest to the general public as to the
military history buff. The work under
review treats an important leader who
may be in particular need of some rehabilitation, and it is a great advertisement for the entire series. In a single
day’s reading one can dispel many of
the “Strangelovian” myths and appreciate the man, the leader, and the timeless
leadership lessons his example provides.
Tillman skillfully blends elements from
LeMay’s personal and professional lives
with the historical, providing a remarkably nuanced appreciation for this
greatest of bomber generals. Any reader
can profit from this comprehensive account; for instance, any reader familiar
with the classic film Twelve O’clock
High will recognize that a good bit of
LeMay went into Gregory Peck’s character, Brigadier General Frank Savage.
But even the most serious student of
military history is likely to learn something new about LeMay’s life and times.
Tillman’s portrayal of LeMay, however,
is not solely complimentary. While he
obviously has great appreciation and
admiration for his subject, he is also
frank about LeMay’s shortcomings. He
admits that LeMay was much more effective as a commander and operator in
the field than in Washington, D.C., as
vice chief and then chief of staff of the
Air Force. Tillman also calls LeMay’s
decision to run for vice president in
George Wallace’s independent party bid
of 1968 “disastrous for his reputation,”
although he finds any conclusion that
LeMay himself was a racist “demonstrably false.” In sum, LeMay offers a balanced description of the general and his
leadership.
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LeMay’s insights into leadership are still
useful today. The “bedrock of his leadership was professional competence.” He
was known as the premier pilot, navigator, and bombardier in all his early
bomber commands. Throughout the
book, LeMay’s emphasis on competence, accountability to high standards,
teamwork, developing subordinates,
and communication come through
loud and clear. Tillman uses LeMay’s
own words as his final word on leadership: “No matter how well you apply
the art of leadership, no matter how
strong your unit, or how high the morale of your men, if your leadership is
not directed completely toward the
mission, your leadership has failed . . .
[in a single word, leadership is]
Responsibility.”
It is one thing to describe the principles
of leadership. It is quite another to understand how the great leaders in history have lived and applied those
principles. Barrett Tillman’s excellent
narrative salvages both LeMay and his
timeless lessons for today’s leaders.
DAVID BUCKWALTER

Naval War College

Davis, Lance E., and Stanley L. Engerman. Naval
Blockades in Peace and War: An Economic History
since 1750. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press,
2006. 325pp. $85

As its title states, this book is an economic history examining the impact of
naval blockades in general, but it really
focuses on four major wars since 1750:
the Napoleonic Wars (including the
War of 1812), the American Civil War,
World War I, and World War II (including the U.S. blockade of Japan).
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While providing voluminous data on
the economic effectiveness of naval
blockades, the authors’ conclusions are
generally dismissive of their military
usefulness, suggesting that an opponent’s “military strength” and “productive capacity play a more important role
in the outcome of war.”
Yet this negative assessment of blockades seems to run counter to many of
the book’s case studies, such as the War
of 1812, which the authors call “a military disaster for the United States.”
During the American Civil War, the
Northern blockade against the South
played “a significant role in the Union
victory.” In World War I, Germany’s
debilitating “food crisis” was mainly
due to “the effectiveness of the Allied
blockade.” Finally, in World War II the
U.S. blockade against Japan was so tight
that “it may have been the most effective naval blockade in history.”
Given these generally positive views, it
comes as a genuine surprise when the
authors conclude by suggesting that the
success rate of naval blockades “does
not seem very high,” and that nations
will continue “to deploy blockades, but
greater success than that which has occurred in the past should not be
expected.”
One problem might be the tables, some
142 in all, which document in minute
detail the impact of naval blockades on
wartime economies. Unfortunately, virtually all these tables were adapted from
previous works, and some have not
been updated. Another possible problem might be the authors’ too-narrow
focus on economic factors rather than
on how economic and military pressure
jointly achieved victory. The inability of
the Confederacy to obtain iron plates
from abroad to construct its own navy,
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due mainly to the effectiveness of the
Union blockade, is one case in point.
The tight U.S. blockade against the Japanese home islands in combination
with the use of the atom bomb may
have been crucial in forcing Japan to
surrender.
Before naval blockades are dismissed as
an ineffective strategy, many other successful naval blockades that did not include large economic components
would have to be considered. The authors of this book barely mention the
U.S. “quarantine” during the Cuban
Missile Crisis or Britain’s use of maritime exclusion zones while retaking the
Falkland Islands, both widely considered to be highly effective examples of
naval blockades.
BRUCE ELLEMAN

Naval War College

Ferreiro, Larrie D. Ships and Science: The Birth of
Naval Architecture in the Scientific Revolution,
1600–1800. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007.
432pp. $45

This is the first in a planned two-volume
history of the application of scientific
theory to ship design. Larrie Ferreiro is
well qualified to take this on, having
both trained and worked as a naval architect and having earned a PhD in the
history of science and technology.
The sailing ship was arguably the most
complex mechanical system in common
use prior to the Industrial Revolution.
Thus a natural development of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries was, for emerging “scientists,” to try to explain the behavior of the ship at sea. The initial
goals were to understand how it was
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